Eleonore Stump (ch. 9) contrasts philosophy (which addresses the abstract universal of wisdom) with theology (which engages with a person, God). Recalling Scott’s distinction between knowledge and understanding, Stump argues that knowledge of persons is irreducible to knowledge that something is the case and maintains that ‘knowledge of a person can be had without propositional knowledge that that person exists’ (p. 181). But in a religious context, this just amounts to the hubristic ‘Christians-before-Christ’ claim that atheists can have genuine knowledge of God without recognizing it as such. The reader is left to speculate what Stump might mean by her undefended assertion that ‘God . . . is somehow both being itself and also a being’ (p. 185).

This volume is a bold attempt at a more humane philosophy of religion that aims to broaden the discipline’s conceptual foundations. Many of the contributors engage with each other’s work and they do not always agree. Importantly, this allows the reader to eavesdrop on frank discussion of whether a broader philosophical focus on affect and religious practice might not sometimes be used illegitimately to sidestep the more traditional ontological questions by just refusing to engage with them. *New Models of Religious Understanding* will be of interest to anyone who has read a work of philosophy of religion with John Macquarrie’s sense that there must be a better way. It will be essential reading for anyone working in the field.

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There is no questioning the importance of a book like *Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge*. With volumes like *The Oxford Handbook of Numerical Cognition* coming out in recent years, it is clear that there is a wealth of empirical data available for philosophical considerations on the cognitive foundations of mathematical knowledge. There have also been important monographs, such as Stanislas Dehaene’s *The Number Sense* and Susan Carey’s *The Origin of Concepts*, that have acquired the status of standard reference works both for empirical scientists and philosophers. What has been lacking, however, is a distinctively philosophical volume that aims to connect the empirical developments to fundamental issues in the philosophy of mathematics. This is what *Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge* sets out to do, and based on a conference held at
the University of Bergen in 2015, Sorin Bangu has gathered together a fine group of authors to contribute.

As the subtitle of the volume suggests, the authors are not limited to philosophers. The psychologists Kristy vanMarle and Karen Wynn provide overviews of the empirical data on early numerical cognition, and the cognitive scientists Josephine Relaford-Doyle and Rafael Núñez provide interesting empirical data on the actual number concepts used by mathematically untrained adults. In addition, the psychologist Rolf Reber writes about the connection between beauty and truth in mathematics.

However, the overarching theme of the book is philosophical. It consists of Bangu’s short but informative introduction and fourteen contributed chapters. Wynn’s chapter ‘Origins of Numerical Knowledge’ was originally published already in 1995 and it is the only contribution not written especially for this volume. Bangu (p. 7) explains that Wynn’s contribution is included because ‘the philosophical significance of this kind of work has not received enough philosophical attention’. It is easy to agree with that and Wynn has undoubtedly had a crucial role as a pioneer in the study of infant numerical cognition. Nevertheless, the inclusion of a 23-year-old paper is somewhat baffling. A great deal of progress has been made recently in this area, as becomes clear from vanMarle’s highly informative chapter. One wishes that Wynn’s paper could at least have been updated for this volume.

The contributions are generally of high quality, but the range of topics leave something to be desired. The most glaring omission is that of geometrical knowledge, which is only given the occasional passing reference. Given the rising amount of empirical work devoted to the cognitive basis of geometry, this is unfortunate. Indeed, with quite few exceptions, the mathematical knowledge discussed in the book refers to arithmetical knowledge. While this emphasis is understandable—after all, numerical cognition is the most developed area of empirical research when it comes to naturalizing mathematical knowledge—one would have hoped for more variety in the topics. In particular worth noting is that for a book called Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge, there is conspicuously little about logical knowledge in it. Aside from part of the chapter by Penelope Maddy, logic is not given explicit treatment. In addition, Paul J. Robinson and Richard Samuels provide an excellent chapter debunking regress arguments against inferential rule following, which is highly relevant for all areas of mathematics, including logic. However, the vast majority of the papers in the volume discuss numerical cognition and arithmetical knowledge, making the title of the book somewhat misleading.

Although there is variance in their novelty and relevance, most contributions succeed in tackling a pertinent philosophical problem. In some chapters, most notably Mark Fedyk’s chapter on intuition and Fabio Sterpetti’s defence
of the analytic rather than axiomatic view of mathematical knowledge, the discussion of naturalisation is conducted on a philosophical basis without making substantial connections to empirical data. Some of the empirical papers, most notably Reber’s chapter on beauty and truth, do not engage sufficiently in the philosophical literature. Most chapters, however, follow the main theme of the book by making a philosophical contribution that in some way applies empirical results. Byeong-uk Yi’s chapter provides a good example of the great usefulness of this kind of approach. Yi repeats his earlier argument for the plural property view of numbers, but this time with parts devoted to the empirical data on numerical estimation without counting. The result is an interesting new take on an old debate (whether numbers are properties and if so, what are they properties of). Similarly, Max Jones in his chapter discusses the possibility of updating perhaps the most famous pre-nineties account of naturalizing mathematical knowledge—that of Philip Kitcher—and manages to shed new light by evoking modern empirical data concerning numerical cognition.

One topic that could have received more attention in the book is to what extent mathematical knowledge is culturally determined. Starting from such early origins as acquiring first numeral words, the social character of mathematical practice and learning is a central topic in the modern literature. The two contributions that discuss it explicitly (Helen de Cruz’s chapter on learning through testimony and the chapter by Karim Zahidi and Erik Myin stressing the sociocultural character of mathematical knowledge) are thus important additions to the collection, as is Dirk Schlimm’s well-researched chapter on the importance of particular external representations of numbers to arithmetical thinking. Equally important is the chapter by Jean-Charles Pelland, in which he points out a seemingly simple but important flaw in the standard way of explaining the ontogeny of number concepts by acquiring a numeral list: at least in some cases, people must have been able to acquire number concepts without being given ready-made numeral lists.

With several excellent chapters discussing the philosophical problems involving the connections between numbers, numerals and early numerical cognition, Bangu’s book is successful in many ways. Despite not quite delivering what it says on the cover, this book provides something that has been badly missed in the philosophy of mathematics: a single volume that serves as a good introduction to many of the issues at the center of naturalizing mathematical knowledge. Due to its limited scope, however, equally many important issues are not included. Nevertheless, it is a collection of high-quality contributions, which works both as an introduction to the subject and as a highly useful review of the kind of philosophical issues involved. In this function, one can only hope that it will reach a wide audience among researchers and students interested in the cognitive foundations of mathematics. Equally important, one

Much human misery arises from flawed thinking. For example, people overestimate the probability of bad outcomes or take their lives to be worse than they actually are. It seems obvious that philosophy—with its emphasis on reason and evidence—can help to identify such flaws.

So far philosophical contributions to cognitive therapy or self-help have mainly drawn on two sources: ancient thinkers such as Epicurus, Seneca, and Epictetus; and existential philosophers such as Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Iddo Landau, in contrast, utilizes contemporary analytic philosophy. His particular concern is the issue of the meaning of life. In ‘Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World’, Landau criticizes several common arguments for the meaninglessness of life. He also develops strategies for identifying and recognizing meaning. Although some aspects of his book need further defence, it impressively achieves its main goal: Landau improves both academics’ and non-academics’ thinking about this important topic, and helps us making and considering our lives more meaningful.

The book starts with an explanation of what it means to say that a life has or does not have meaning. Focusing on the individual human life, Landau interprets this notion in an evaluative (as opposed to a cognitive) sense. More specifically, he regards the meaning of life as a second-order value. Lives are meaningful if and only if they involve ‘a sufficient number of aspects of sufficient value’ (p. 15). After these introductory remarks Landau goes on to reject nine arguments against life having meaning in this sense.

Perfection: The first and purportedly most common argument is based on perfectionism. According to perfectionists, only a very high degree of value or value that results from rare and difficult achievements could confer meaning on our lives. Landau argues that this view sets the bar too high. Most people reject perfectionism for values other than the meaning of life (such as beauty). Typically, we also do not apply such high standards in evaluating others. Requiring perfection seems both unreasonable and cruel towards